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THE MEDICAL MONITORING REMEDY: ONGOING
CONTROVERSY AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
ADAM P. JOFFE*
INTRODUCTION
For decades, a central tenet of tort law has been that a plaintiff may
not recover damages for negligence absent physical injury.1 In 1984, how-
ever, a landmark case seemed to fly in the face of this principle by holding
a defendant liable to provide medical examinations to determine if there
were, in fact, injuries to the plaintiffs.2 In the twenty-five years since
Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. recognized such a
claim,3 states have been sharply divided on the appropriateness of remedies
based on so-called "medical monitoring." '4
A recent, high profile toy recall has once again placed a spotlight on
the issue of medical monitoring. 5 In August 2007, Mattel, Inc. recalled
hundreds of thousands of toys after high levels of lead were found in the
paint used on the toys' surfaces. 6 Although no injuries have been reported
among the children exposed to the tainted toys, some parents responded to
the recall by filing lawsuits against Mattel and other toy manufacturers
responsible for the placement of these toys in the American marketplace. 7
These lawsuits seek medical monitoring for the children. 8 A medical moni-
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, May 2009; B.A., Psy-
chology, Washington University in St. Louis, 2003. I would like to thank my parents, Susan and Julian,
and my brother, Andrew, for their constant support. I am also particularly grateful to Professor Mickie
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1. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 165 (5th ed. 1984).
2. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
3. Id. at 826.
4. Medical monitoring damages generally involve in a defendant establishing a fund for ongoing
testing of individuals who were exposed to potentially toxic agents. As will become clear below, vari-
ous jurisdictions look at the issue of medical monitoring quite differently. A number of jurisdictions
disallow medical monitoring awards. See infra notes 61-62 and 71-76. Other jurisdictions allow medi-
cal monitoring awards with relatively few restrictions. See infra notes 15, 43, 77-79, and 81. Still other
jurisdictions permit medical monitoring if fairly strict requirements are met. See infra notes 35-37.
5. Amir Efrati, Toy Recalls May Push 'Medical Monitoring' Debate; Suits Seek Funds to Test





toring award could require Mattel to pay a lump sum or to set aside a spe-
cial fund to pay for ongoing medical examinations for the exposed chil-
dren.9
Washington, D.C., attorney Victor Schwartz places medical monitor-
ing "among the greatest divisions in all of tort law among judges."lO At
present, approximately half of the states that have addressed the issue of
medical monitoring would permit the Mattel litigation, while the other half
would reject such lawsuits.11
In Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 12 the United States
Supreme Court held that a medical monitoring remedy would not be per-
mitted in a lawsuit arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA). 13 However, Metro-North does not bind state courts because the
majority of cases in which plaintiffs seek medical monitoring are based on
state laws regarding "toxic torts."' 14 Therefore, the results of cases in which
plaintiffs sue for medical monitoring have varied widely from state to state,
and a number of post-Metro-North cases illustrate that certain states remain
committed to maintaining medical monitoring as a legitimate remedy.15
Further, as the American Law Institute (ALI) continues its work on
the Restatement (Third) of Torts, it seems prepared to endorse medical
monitoring awards. 16 With this potential endorsement of medical monitor-
ing, however, numerous questions arise about what limitations should be
required to ensure proper use of medical monitoring awards and how funds
should be distributed when medical monitoring is awarded. 17
In light of the Mattel litigation and the ALI's discussion surrounding




12. 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
13. For further discussion of this case, see Victor E. Schwartz, Leah Lorber & Emily J. Laird,
Medical Monitoring: The Right Way and the Wrong Way, 70 Mo. L. REv 349, 362 (2005).
14. The term "toxic tort" refers to "[a] civil wrong arising from exposure to a toxic substance ......
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1527 (8th ed. 2004). For further discussion of toxic torts, see Kara L.
McCall, Comment, Medical Monitoring Plaintiffs and Subsequent Claims for Disease, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 969, 977 (1999).
15. See, e.g., Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing
medical monitoring absent injury in litigation based on pharmaceutical weight-loss product Fenflura-
mine and Phentermine); Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 869 (I1. App. Ct. 2003) (allow-
ing medical monitoring absent physical injury in a case related to children being exposed to lead paint);
Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999) (allowing medical monitoring
absent injury in litigation related to exposure to toxic substances emanating from a pile of debris).
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECONOMIC TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 21
(Council Draft No. 1, 2006).
17. See infra part I1.
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monitoring will likely remain at the forefront of legal dialogue. If medical
monitoring is to be recognized as a legitimate remedy, it is vital to the pres-
ervation of judicial resources that courts set appropriate standards such that
deserving plaintiffs can seek medical monitoring, while courts can easily
identify and dismiss frivolous lawsuits. Further, it is imperative that the
judicial approach for awarding medical monitoring avoids plaintiff wind-
falls by establishing a strict system to ensure that any monetary awards
earmarked for medical monitoring are actually spent on medical examina-
tions.
Part I of this note defines medical monitoring and discusses the judi-
cial history relevant to medical monitoring. Part II discusses some common
criticisms of medical monitoring. Part III proposes strict standards that a
plaintiff must meet to become eligible for a medical monitoring award. Part
IV proposes a system for effectively distributing funds for medical moni-
toring in order to prevent windfalls for plaintiffs and financial calamity for
defendants.
I. MEDICAL MONITORING AND ASSOCIATED JUDICIAL HISTORY
A. What Is Medical Monitoring?
In the legal context, "medical monitoring" is a remedy seeking to re-
cover the cost of future medical examinations aimed at detecting an illness
or illnesses not present at the time of the lawsuit. 18 This remedy is rooted in
a desire to promote the public health benefits of early detection and the
lower medical costs that come with early detection.19 Further, proponents
of the medical monitoring remedy argue that it prevents plaintiffs from
having to pay for examinations that they would not need but for the actions
of a defendant, and, therefore, "better serving societal notions of fairness
and justice."'20
Plaintiffs frequently seek medical monitoring in "toxic tort" cases. 21
One commentator describes medical monitoring as "a remedy designed to
provide healthy plaintiffs with the means to undergo periodic medical test-
ing deemed necessarily [sic] to facilitate the early detection of diseases
caused by toxic substances."'22 This reasoning relies on the idea that early
18. Kira Elert, Note: Dillon v. Evanston Hospital: Illinois Adopts the New Increased Risk Doctrine
Governing Recovery for Future Injury, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 685, 708 (2003).
19. Id. at 709.
20. Id.
21. See McCall, supra note 14, at 969-70.
22. Terry C. Gay & Paige F. Rosato, Combatting Fear of Future Injury and Medical Monitoring
Claims, 61 DEF. COuNS. J. 554, 557 (1994).
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detection of many illnesses lowers the cost of fighting those illnesses and
increases a plaintiff's chance of survival. 23
B. Friends for All Children and the Birth of a New Remedy
Until the mid 1980s, the legal concept of medical monitoring was only
mentioned in dicta.24 During this time, tort law followed the traditional
concept that "[t]he threat of future harm, not yet realized, is not enough" to
pursue a claim in tort.25
Then, in 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia heard arguments for Friends for All Children.26 In this case, a
plane carrying Vietnamese orphans crashed on its way from South Vietnam
to the United States. 27 During the crash, the cabin experienced violent de-
compression and a loss of oxygen. 28 The plaintiffs alleged that the surviv-
ing orphans were likely to suffer from a specific brain impairment.29 The
court determined that a remedy of medical monitoring should be awarded
to determine if the orphans had suffered this neurological damage.30 How-
ever, the court placed a number of limitations on its holding, distinguishing
Friends for All Children from the approaches to medical monitoring that
many jurisdictions use today. 31 The Friends for All Children Court held
that the orphans' injuries were not speculative because they arose from a
specific, traumatic event 32 in which the orphans had been injured at the
moment of the crash. 33 The court set out three requirements for the dis-
bursement of its medical monitoring award. 34 First, rather than awarding
the money for medical monitoring in one lump sum, the court created a
voucher system in which Lockheed, the defendant, distributed money from
a fund after the orphans' guardians completed a voucher detailing specific
23. See Elert, supra note 18, at 708.
24. It is widely held that the earliest mention of medical monitoring occurred in Morrissy v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1375-76 (Il1. App. Ct. 1979). See George W.C. McCarter, Medical Sue-
Veillance: A History and Critique of the Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 45
RUTGERS L. REV. 227, 231-32 (1993).
25. KEETON, supra note 1, at 165.
26. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
27. Id. at 819.
28. Id.
29. This specific neurological disorder was generically described in the complaint as Minimal
Brain Dysfunction ("MBD"). Id.
30. Id. at 835.
31. See, e.g., the Ayers standard, discussed in depth infra part 1, § C.
32. Compare this to medical monitoring awards in sundry "toxic tort" cases. See, e.g., supra note
15 and infra part I, § C.
33. 746 F.2d at 825-826.
34. These requirements are laid out and discussed further in Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 360.
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medical expenses. 35 Second, the court established a panel of medical ex-
perts to determine whether to give a specific test to a specific child.36
Third, the court specified that money remaining in the fund would be re-
turned to Lockheed in order to prevent a windfall for the plaintiffs. 37
Friends for All Children presented the court with the "perfect storm"
of sympathetic plaintiffs, 38 present and quantifiable injuries to accompany
the possible undiscovered injuries that would be monitored,39 a defendant
that would not collapse financially with an adverse judgment,40 a situation
where early detection would greatly improve the prognosis for the plain-
tiffs, 41 and a reasonable monetary disbursement system. 42 Limitations
aside, a new remedy, incubated in 1970s dicta, had been born.
C. Ayers v. Township of Jackson and Theer v. Phillip Carey Co.: One
State, Two Differing Holdings
If medical monitoring was born in Friends for All Children, then it is
safe to say that it reached adulthood in Ayers v. Township of Jackson.4 3 In
Ayers, residents of a New Jersey town sought money for medical monitor-
ing after a landfill operated by the town began leaking potentially hazard-
ous pollutants into their well. 44 Despite the fact that none of the residents
displayed any ill effects from the pollutants at the time of the trial, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey awarded medical monitoring to the plaintiffs. 45
This awarding of medical monitoring absent physical injury represented a
sharp departure from the measured language and strict limitations that the
Friends for All Children Court used when announcing its decision.
Ayers is also relevant because it represented the first time that a court
attempted to lay out elements that a plaintiff must meet in order to win a
medical monitoring award. 46 The Ayers Court held that a plaintiff must
35. Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 823.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 823 n.10.
38. It is difficult to imagine a more sympathetic class of plaintiffs than approximately 150 refugee
orphans.
39. Quantifiable and present injuries varied from plaintiff to plaintiff, but most suffered physical
injuries from the impact of the crash in addition to the potential MBD.
40. As a major corporation, Lockheed certainly had the money to establish a fund for medical
monitoring of the plaintiffs.
41. "[I]f the underlying neurological disorders, if any, remain undiagnosed ... much longer, the
prognosis for these children ... is poor." Id. at 823.
42. Discussed infra part IV, § B.
43. 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
44. Id. at291.
45. Id. at 320.
46. Carey C. Jordan, Comment, Medical Monitoring in Toxic Tort Cases: Another Windfall for
2009]
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address the following factors through expert testimony: (1) the significance
and extent of exposure to chemicals; (2) the toxicity of the chemicals; (3)
the seriousness of diseases for which individuals are at risk; (4) the relative
increase in the chance of onset of disease in those exposed; and (5) the
value of early diagnosis. 47 This early attempt at creating a multi-factor test
has been widely decried as creating subjective and unquantifiable factors
that would be difficult for courts to apply consistently.48
As subjective and unquantifiable as those factors might have been,
however, they acted as a foundation for tests developed by a large number
of states that have accepted the medical monitoring remedy. 49 On the heels
of Ayers, a federal district court (applying Colorado law) permitted an
award of medical monitoring in a case involving exposure to hazardous
waste from a nuclear weapons facility where no illness was present prior to
or during the time of trial. 50 Pennsylvania followed by awarding medical
monitoring absent illness in a case involving exposure to private hazardous
materials. 51 Shortly thereafter, West Virginia held that it could award
medical monitoring even if a plaintiff was not able "to show that a particu-
lar disease is certain or even likely to occur as a result of exposure. '52
Around this time, Florida also granted an award of medical monitoring to
individuals who had used the weight loss drug Fenfluramine and Phenter-
mine ("Fen-Phen"). 53
However, in a plot twist, the Supreme Court of New Jersey (the same
court that had heard Ayers just seven years earlier) heard Theer v. Philip
Carey Co.54 In Theer, the plaintiff was the wife of a deceased asbestos
Texas Plaintiffs?, 33 Hous. L. REv. 473, 489 (1996).
47. Ayers, 525 A.2dat 312.
48. See, e.g., McCarter, supra note 24, at 239 (describing the elements as "an amalgam of subjec-
tive criteria"); Jordan, supra note 56, at 489 (describing the elements as "unquantifiable generalities"
and providing an illuminating discussion of each element).
49. Jordan, supra note 46, at 489.
50. Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 778 F. Supp.512 (D. Col. 1991).
51. Redland Soccer Club v. Dep't of the Army, 696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997).
52. Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424,433 (W. Va. 1999).
53. Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 106-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (plaintiffs
seeking medical monitoring had to meet the following elements:
(1) exposure greater than normal background levels; (2) to a proven hazardous substance; (3)
caused by the defendant's negligence; (4) as a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff has a
significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease; (5) a monitoring procedure
exists that makes the early detection of the disease possible; (6) the prescribed monitoring re-
gime is different from that normally recommended in the absence of exposure; and (7) the
prescribed monitoring regime is reasonably necessary according to contemporary scientific
principles.
Id.
54. 628 A.2d 724 (N.J. 1993).
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worker.55 She sought, among other things, an award of medical monitoring
because she frequently handled her husband's asbestos-laden clothing dur-
ing the time of his employment. 56 Strictly following the Ayers elements, the
plaintiff would seemingly be able make a strong argument in favor of being
awarded medical monitoring. 57 However, this time, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey ruled the other way. 58 In doing so, the court made an important
distinction between Theer and Ayers, reasoning that "[i]f a plaintiff is ex-
posed to a product in an indirect manner, and, further, has not suffered
from any injury or condition relating to that exposure, it becomes increas-
ingly difficult for courts and juries to determine the direct correlation be-
tween the indirect exposure and any future risk of injury." 59 This
distinction between direct and indirect exposure to hazardous materials is
an important limitation and could be interpreted as the New Jersey court
partially "reigning in" its previous holding that might have otherwise led to
a flood of cases.
D. Not Every State Followed the Lead of Friends for All Children and
Ayers in Awarding Medical Monitoring Absent Injury
Although Friends for All Children and Ayers provided the impetus for
states that chose to award medical monitoring absent injury, a number of
states chose to follow traditional tort law, requiring a present injury in order
to pursue a negligence claim.60 In Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc., for exam-
ple, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (applying
Virginia law) rejected the notion that medical monitoring could be awarded
absent physical injury in a toxic materials case.6 1 In Baker v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana (applying Indiana law) failed to award medical monitoring in a
55. Id. at 726.
56. Id.
57. Applying each of the Ayers elements might yield an analysis as follows: the plaintiff handled
her husband's asbestos-covered clothes on an almost daily basis, leading to significant exposure to the
chemicals and fulfilling element one. Asbestos was the same substance that led to her husband's death
from cancer, strongly implying that asbestos has a high level of toxicity and leads to serious illness,
therefore fulfilling elements two and three. Studies have shown that exposure to asbestos increases the
risk of various forms of cancer significantly, therefore fulfilling element four. Finally, early detection of
cancer results in an increased likelihood of successful treatment. Therefore, the Theer plaintiff would
seemingly fulfill each of the Ayers elements and would be entitled to an award of medical monitoring.
58. Theer, 628 A.2d at 733.
59. Id.
60. States that require physical injury for awards in torts cases include: Alabama, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Washington.
61. 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991).
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case of exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"), a known hazard-
ous substance. 62
E. The United States Supreme Court Weighs in: Metro-North and the
Change of Momentum Against Medical Monitoring
In 1997, a full thirteen years after Friends for All Children had be-
come the first case to award medical monitoring absent a traditional injury,
the United States Supreme Court took its first look at the issue. 63 Metro-
North involved a railroad worker who frequently handled asbestos (and, in
fact, was often covered in asbestos) yet did not suffer any symptoms of
diseases related to the asbestos. 64 After attending an "asbestos awareness"
class, the plaintiff began to fear that he would develop cancer. 65 The plain-
tiff sued for the cost of future medical examinations. 66
In refusing to award the plaintiff the cost of future medical examina-
tions by a seven-to-two vote, the Court made a number of important points.
First, the Court distinguished Metro-North from Friends for All Children
by pointing to the fact that Friends for All Children involved "the presence
of a traumatic physical impact" that was clearly absent in Metro-North.67
Second, the Court expressed a fear that permitting medical monitoring
absent physical symptoms could open up the floodgates to unmanageable
levels of litigation, draining judicial resources and harming businesses in
the process. 68 Third, the Court expressed concern about a possible inability
among medical professionals to agree on what tests would be useful and
what tests would be wasteful in medical monitoring cases. 69 Finally, the
Court expressed concern that medical monitoring awards could potentially
result in windfalls for plaintiffs who are covered by insurance and therefore
have alternative sources of payment for medical examinations. 70
Though Metro-North does not require the states to disallow medical
monitoring awards, examining state cases before and after Metro-North
suggests that the Court's holding might have marked the beginning of a sea
of change, with momentum moving away from medical monitoring claims.
62. 70 F.3d 951, 954 (7th Cir. 1995).
63. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
64. Id. at 427.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 440.
68. Id. at 442-43.
69. Id. at 441.
70. Id. at 442-43.
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For example, in Trimble v. Asarco, Inc.,71 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit noted that Nebraska does not recognize com-
mon law liability for medical monitoring. 72 In Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc.,
the Supreme Court of Nevada noted that the state would recognize medical
monitoring, if at all, only as a remedy and not as an independent cause of
action. 73 In Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., the Supreme Court of Kentucky
held that a plaintiff must show a present physical injury to support a medi-
cal monitoring award. 74 In Hinton v. Monsanto Co., the Supreme Court of
Alabama found "insufficient justification" to expand Alabama tort law to
encompass a remedy for medical monitoring absent present physical in-
jury. 75 Finally, in Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Mississippi recently held that Mississippi law does not permit
medical monitoring awards absent present physical injury. 76
However, just as some states stayed committed to traditional tort law
even in the heyday of Ayers, other states have remained committed to al-
lowing medical monitoring absent a present physical injury after Metro-
North. A notable example is Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass 'n, Inc. ,77 where the
plaintiffs sought medical monitoring after their children were exposed to
high levels of lead pigment used in paint.78 In holding the paint manufac-
turer liable to provide medical monitoring, an Illinois appellate court relied
on a line of reasoning that had been used since Friends for All Children:
"[t]he injury which is alleged ... in a claim seeking damages for a medical
examination to detect possible physical injury is the cost of the examina-
tion."' 79 In other words, in cases where the plaintiff seeks medical monitor-
ing, the injury is not the increased risk of future harm but the violation of
an individual's interest in not having to pay for expensive medical test-
ing.80 Lewis is an important case in that it highlights the fact that many
states-indeed, approximately half of the states that have addressed the
issue-allow medical monitoring awards absent present injury even in a
post-Metro-North world.81
71. 232 F.3d 946, (8th Cir. 2000) (involving a class action suit against a lead smelter and refinery
for exposing nearby residents to pollutants).
72. Id. at 963.
73. 16 P.3d 435, 441 (Nev. 2001) (involving exposure to cigarette smoke).
74. 82 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Ky. 2002) (involving heart disease associated with the weight loss drug
Fen-Phen).
75. 813 So. 2d 827, 829 (Ala. 2001) (involving exposure to PCBs).
76. 949 So. 2d 1, 3 (Miss. 2007) (involving exposure to airborne beryllium).
77. 793 N.E.2d 869 (Il1. App. Ct. 2003).
78. Id. at 871.
79. Id. at 874.
80. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
81. See, e.g., Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Bower v.
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Also relevant in illustrating that point is the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's recent holding in Gates v.
Rohm & Haas, Co. 82 In Gates, residents of an Illinois town claimed that
ground water contamination caused high rates of brain cancer in their
community.83 In denying a motion to dismiss, the judge held that "[g]iven
the apparent trend of the federal and appellate courts in Illinois, the cost of
diagnostic testing, even if periodic or ongoing, likely is a compensable
injury under Illinois law."'84
F. Will the Restatement (Third) of Torts Advocate Recognition of the
Medical Monitoring Remedy Absent Physical Injury?
In 2004, the ALI began work on the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
Section 21 of the current version of the council draft discusses preventive
expenses.85 At this stage, the ALl seems prepared to endorse medical moni-
toring awards absent present injury, albeit with limitations similar to those
in Friends for All Children.86 For instance, Comment C of the council draft
imposes two limitations on the medical monitoring remedy. 87 First, "a de-
fendant is liable for the expense only when its conduct places the claimant
in a position where monitoring is medically warranted by the prospect that
early diagnosis of a latent condition will improve the chance of beneficial
medical intervention. ' 88 Second, "the expense cannot provide a material
benefit to the claimant other than preventing or mitigating the risk of bodily
harm created by the defendant." '89
Also similar to the Friends for All Children approach, the ALI sup-
ports the disbursement of monetary awards through a fund as opposed to a
lump sum.90 Stating that "[w]hen a claimant seeks to recover the cost of
future medical monitoring, rather than give a lump sum award of the cost
of the monitoring a court should require the damages be placed in a fund or
to be used to procure insurance coverage for future medical monitoring,"
the ALl recognizes that there are risks associated with awarding money
directly to victims with the hope that the money will actually be used for
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999).
82. No. 06-1743, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54210 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2007).
83. Id. at *4.
84. Id. at *16.
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 16, § 21.
86. See Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 16, § 21 cmt c.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. § 21 cmt. d.
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medical monitoring. 91
Finally, the ALl suggests disallowing medical monitoring awards
when it is "uncertain whether the exposure necessitates the expense or
whether the expense provides some other benefit and the affected individu-
als can be fairly expected to bear the expense because the expense is
small... or it will be borne by their health insurers or employers. '92 With
its tacit acceptance of medical monitoring, subject to a variety of specific
limitations, the ALI appears prepared to return the medical monitoring
remedy to its specific and limited origins.
II. COMMON CRITICISMS OF THE MEDICAL MONITORING REMEDY
Though medical monitoring awards absent physical injury remain
permitted in nearly half the states whose courts have addressed the issue,
the remedy is not without its critics. Some detractors fear that permitting a
medical monitoring remedy absent physical injury would place undue
stress on the courts,93 while others fear that permitting a medical monitor-
ing remedy could place undue stress on medical resources. 94 Additionally,
several medical monitoring opponents contend that tests like the Ayers
factors are judicially unmanageable. 95 Other critics, while not objecting to
the medical monitoring remedy per se, fear that medical monitoring awards
could lead to plaintiff windfalls and financial disaster for defendants. 96
A. Medical Monitoring Could Lead to a Flood of Litigation, Severely
Stressing the Courts
In Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs, the Supreme Court of Kentucky rec-
ognized the "potential flood of litigation stemming from unsubstantiated or
fabricated prospective harms" if a medical monitoring remedy was recog-
nized absent present physical injury.97 This language echoed the majority's
concern in Metro-North.98 Commentators have taken this concern and ex-
91. Id.
92. Id. § 21 cmt. e.
93. See, e.g., Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley,
521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997) (expressing concern that, in recognizing a medical monitoring cause of
action, "tens of millions of individuals may have suffered exposure to substances that might justify
some form of substance-exposure-related medical monitoring.")
94. See, e.g., McCarter, supra note 24, at 281; Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 369.
95. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 46, at 489 (referring to the Ayers elements as "five unquantifiable
generalities").
96. See, e.g., Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 370-74.
97. 82 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Ky. 2002).
98. 521 U.S. at442.
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pounded upon it, recognizing that unhealthy and potentially dangerous
pollutants exist in virtually every community.99 Permitting lawsuits seeking
medical monitoring for every individual who lives near one of these poten-
tial dangers could inundate the courts with thousands of tort lawsuits filed
by individuals who are currently in perfect health. 00
Consider the following example. A metropolitan area has 450,000
residents. Of these residents, 50,000 live within fifty yards of high voltage
power lines. Another 50,000 live in older apartment buildings with lead
paint on the walls. Still another 50,000 live near the city's paper mill,
which emits smoke into the air and chemical runoff into a lake. Now as-
sume that this metropolitan area follows the medical monitoring standard
that the Supreme Court of West Virginia set out in Bower.101 Suddenly,
one-third of the residents of this metropolitan area would be able to sue for
medical monitoring, regardless of whether they have any illness at the time
they file suit. Clearly, these suits would place an enormous burden on the
courts in this jurisdiction, and permitting such suits would be an ineffective
use of judicial resources.
B. Medical Monitoring Could Put Stress on Limited Medical Resources
Not only could permitting medical monitoring awards absent present
injury put an undue burden on the judicial system, but some critics contend
that it could place an undue burden on medical resources, thereby hurting
public health. 102 The Alabama Supreme Court in Hinton was among the
most explicit in expressing its concern about "vast testing liability ad-
versely affecting the allocation of scarce medical resources. '103
Other commentators have focused on negative effects that would re-
sult from an increase in demand for medical examinations stemming from
an over-awarded medical monitoring remedy. 104 In Canada, for example,
where demand for medical examinations is extremely high due to national-
99. John J. Kalas, Medical Surveillance Damages in Toxic Tort Litigation: A Half Hearted Em-
brace, 2 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 126, 141 (1992).
100. Id.
101. As explained supra, the Bower standard states that a plaintiff may be entitled to medical
monitoring even if that plaintiff is not able "to show that a particular disease is certain or even likely to
occur as a result of exposure." Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 433 (W. Va. 1999).
102. See, e.g., McCarter, supra note 24, at 281.
103. Hinton v. Monsanto, Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 831 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Metro-North Commuter
R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 441 (1997)).
104. See, e.g., McCarter, supra note 24, at 281-82. Such commentators argue that awards of medi-
cal monitoring increase the likelihood that plaintiffs will seek medical examinations that they would not
seek if they were forced to pay for these examinations out of their own pockets. Therefore, medical
resources would be more highly burdened.
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ized healthcare, the government has resorted to discouraging the general
population from seeking yearly check-ups because it would place too great
of a burden on the nation's medical resources. 105 This argument contends
that lenient standards for lawsuits seeking medical monitoring would in-
crease demand for healthcare to the point that the healthcare system would
suffer. 106 These critics argue that for a medical monitoring remedy to be
feasible, medical professionals should carefully analyze which examina-
tions are an appropriate use of medical resources and which examinations
are wasteful. 107
While concern about the effect of lenient standards for medical moni-
toring awards on the healthcare system may seem merely academic, the
consequences potentially could be very real. Consider, for example, a pa-
tient with a condition such as severely clogged arteries or potentially treat-
able cancer. In such cases, a matter of days or even hours is frequently the
deciding factor between life and death.108 It is alarming to consider the
possibility that such a patient could face a potentially-fatal delay in seeing a
physician. It is conceivable that such delays could occur if a sudden influx
of uninjured plaintiffs emerge in doctors' offices in search of court-ordered
medical examinations.
C. As Currently Constituted in Many Jurisdictions, Legal Tests for the
Appropriateness of Medical Monitoring Are Judicially Unmanageable
Detractors contend that the legal tests used by some jurisdictions in
cases seeking medical monitoring lead to situations that are judicially un-
manageable. 109 Claiming judicial unmanageability, critics note three im-
portant problems with the medical monitoring remedy. First, in claims
based on injuries that have not yet been realized, it becomes virtually im-
possible to prove causation.' 10 Second, many legal tests used to determine
the appropriateness of medical monitoring awards in specific instances are
vague, leading to unpredictability and inconsistency in medical monitoring
awards."'l Third, appropriate medical examinations vary among individu-
105. Id. at 281.
106. Id. at 281-82.
107. Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 355.
108. See, e.g., American College of Emergency Physicians, Use of Intravenous tPA for the Man-
agement of Acute Stroke in the Emergency Department, http://www.acep.org/practres.aspxid =29936
(last visited Aug. 11, 2009) (discussing a life-saving treatment for stroke victims that works best when
administered within three hours of the stroke).
109. See, e.g., Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 378 (arguing that whether or not medical monitor-
ing should be a recognized cause of action should be the job of legislatures as opposed to courts).
110. Jordan, supra note 46, at 479-80.
11. Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 380.
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als, even after exposure to the same substance, and Courts frequently lack
the expertise to determine if the costs of medical monitoring outweigh the
benefits in specific cases.1 12
1. The Problem of Causation
Medical monitoring awards absent present, physical injury face a dif-
ficult hurdle in the issue of causation. In cases where there is no present
injury at the time of the claim, courts must manipulate the definition of
"injury" before they can even tackle causation. Further, even in potential
medical monitoring cases in which an injury arises prior to filing, causation
remains a prickly topic.
How can a plaintiff show that a defendant caused an injury if no
physical injury has manifested itself? This was an important issue ad-
dressed in Friends for All Children.113 The Friends for All Children Court
made it clear that the plaintiffs' injuries were not their increased risk of
neurological impairments but the necessity of undergoing comprehensive
diagnostic examinations.1 14 These diagnostic examinations, the court rea-
soned, would not have been necessary "but for the fact that these children
endured explosive decompression and hypoxia aboard a plane which sub-
sequently crashed." 115 In considering this reasoning, it is important to re-
member that the plane crash was a specific, traumatic occurrence, as
opposed to toxic tort cases, which are rooted in environmental exposure to
toxins. 116 This distinction was later considered important by the Metro-
North Court when it found that no decisions filed under the FELA have
held a defendant liable to provide medical monitoring in cases of "negli-
gent exposure to a toxic substance."" 17
In fact, showing causation is difficult in toxic tort claims even when
physical injury is present at the time of the filing. 118 In toxic exposure
cases, there is generally a period of latency between exposure to the harm-
ful substance and the onset of illness. 1 9 Depending on how long this la-
tency extends, a number of intervening causes could theoretically bring
about the illness.120 For example, consider a suit seeking medical monitor-
112. Id. at 377.
113. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See supra note 14.
117. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,440 (1997).
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ing filed against a drug manufacturer by a hypothetical plaintiff. This plain-
tiff claims that he developed a heart condition two years after taking the
drug manufacturer's prescription diet pills. While expert witnesses may
testify that taking the drug manufacturer's pills increased the plaintiffs
susceptibility to heart disease, the defendant could argue that the court
needs to consider a number of intervening factors, including diet, exercise
habits, gender, and stress, all of which might have contributed to the plain-
tiff's heart disease. With this in mind, it could become difficult for a court
to hold that the drug manufacturer's diet pills were the proximate cause of
the plaintiffs heart ailment. 121
2. The Problem of Vague Standards Used by Courts in Determining if
They Should Award Medical Monitoring
A common critique of medical monitoring awards absent present in-
jury is that courts use vague standards that lead to inconsistency and unpre-
dictability in the adjudication of cases in which the plaintiff seeks medical
monitoring. 122 As Schwartz, Lorber, and Laird explain, "[a] lack of consis-
tency and specificity in judicially-created eligibility standards has proved
disastrous" in certain actions seeking medical monitoring awards, resulting
in trials that "essentially have become 'games of chance' because of the
lack of clearly delineated standards for recovery."1 23
A prime example of this vagueness is the Ayers test. 124 The Ayers test
established five factors that courts should consider in determining whether
to award medical monitoring absent present injury.125 An analysis of the
Ayers factors leads to an appreciation of the critics' concerns about the test.
The first factor, "the significance and extent of exposure to chemicals,"126
fails to quantify just how much exposure is too much. Must the plaintiff be
exposed to toxins on a daily basis? Must the plaintiff be within a certain
distance of the harmful substance? In considering the second factor, "the
toxicity of the chemicals,"1 27 the court again remains vague and fails to
identify how toxic a chemical must be in order to deem plaintiffs worthy of
medical monitoring. Must the chemical be likely to cause disease or death
121. See also id. (considering lung cancer, an illness that could be caused by, inter alia, asbestos
exposure or tobacco inhalation, therefore creating a question of causation).
122. Id. at 489. See also Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 380.
123. Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 380 n.186.
124. Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987).
125. Id. While Theer reigned in the Ayers holding by requiring direct exposure to harmful sub-
stances, analyzing the Ayers factors is still illustrative of the problem of vagueness of factors currently
considered in New Jersey as well as other jurisdictions. See Theer, 628 A.2d 724, 733 (N.J. 1993).
126. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312.
127. Id.
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within a specific period of time? By what standard should courts evaluate
toxicity? The third factor, "the seriousness of diseases for which individu-
als are at risk," 128 appears to give courts the ability to make value judg-
ments on what constitutes "serious. ' 129 Must the disease cause imminent
death? What if the exposure may cause ailments such as blindness or loss
of taste? The fourth factor, "the relative increase in the chance of onset of
disease in those exposed,"' 130 comes closest to some semblance of objectiv-
ity, yet it still fails to answer the question of how much of an enhanced risk
of illness must be present before medical monitoring should be awarded.
The fifth factor, "the value of early diagnosis,"'131 again places the court in
the uncomfortable position of having to make a moral judgment. Should
"value" be defined as giving a terminally ill plaintiff the ability to live out
her life in less pain, or should medical monitoring awards be limited to
situations in which early detection is likely to prevent death or debilitation?
The Ayers test, in essence, creates more questions than answers.
Subsequent legal tests used in other jurisdictions do not fare much bet-
ter in laying out objective standards by which courts should make determi-
nations about the appropriateness of medical monitoring awards absent
present injury. By way of example, in Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply
Co., the Supreme Court of Utah developed an eight element test. 132 While
this element test at least attempts to define terms such as "beneficial" and
specifies that physicians must make determinations regarding appropriate
examinations, the test still lacks quantifiable standards by which courts
could establish to precisely what extent a plaintiff must be exposed to
harmful substances, how much a plaintiff's risk of illness must be enhanced
by such exposure, and what constitutes "serious." Problems like these are
prevalent in virtually every jurisdiction that has attempted to create a multi-
factor test. 133
128. Id.
129. Many have argued that this value judgment would be more appropriately considered by legis-
latures. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, Emma K. Burton & Jennifer L. Groninger,
Medical Monitoring-Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1076 (1999).
130. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312.
131. Id.
132. 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993). This test is one that I personally consider one of the most
viable of any jurisdiction, yet it still has clear deficiencies. The eight-element test is:
To recover medical monitoring damages under Utah law, a plaintiff must prove the following:
(1) exposure (2) to a toxic substance, (3) which exposure was caused by the defendant's
negligence, (4) resulting in an increased risk (5) of a serious disease, illness or injury (6) for
which a medical test for early detection exists (7) and for which early detection is beneficial,
meaning that a treatment exists that can alter the course of the illness, (8) and which test has
been prescribed by a qualified physician according to contemporary scientific principles.
Id.
133. See, e.g., the Petito test, supra note 53, which would be found similarly deficient when placed
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3. The Problem That Courts Are Not Properly Suited to Determine if
Medical Monitoring Is Appropriate for Specific Individuals
In its holding, the Friends for All Children court established expert
panels consisting of a pediatrician, a psychologist, a psychiatrist, and a
neurologist to determine whether specific diagnostic examinations should
be given to specific plaintiffs. 134 In doing so, the court recognized the need
to provide examinations customized to the individual rather than issuing a
sweeping proclamation that the same battery of tests would be administered
on every plaintiff.135 This policy not only recognized that individualized
examinations best serve the interests of injured parties but that individual-
ized examinations also benefit the defendant by not forcing it to pay for
unnecessary examinations. 136
As critics have pointed out, just because a class of plaintiffs has been
exposed to the same harmful substance does not mean that every member
of that class should be entitled to the same comprehensive diagnostic
scheme. 137 For example, exposure to a specific toxic substance may in-
crease the risk of cancer for an entire population, but courts, through ex-
perts, must determine which individual members of the population are
especially at risk and which members of the population are only minutely
affected by their exposure. 138 Individual characteristics including, among
other things, genes, habits, and age, could play significant roles in deter-
mining how rigorous of a diagnostic course of action should be pursued.
Some critics contend that courts are not properly suited to weigh the
costs and benefits associated with individualized medical monitoring deci-
sions because courts lack a critical understanding of medicine and sci-
ence. 139 These critics point to a number of rationales in support of this
contention. First, they argue that courts lack the scientific knowledge to
determine if the risks of a particular test outweigh its potential benefits for
the plaintiff.140 Second, some commentators feel that the judiciary is not
the proper venue to bring together a panel of experts to make the determi-
under close scrutiny. Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 106-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
134. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 823 & n.9 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
135. See id. at 823.
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 357-59.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 377-78.
140. See id. Certain medical tests, especially invasive ones, pose risks to go along with their poten-
tial benefits. For example, angiograms are important tools in diagnosing heart problems. However, a
certain percentage of individuals receiving angiograms will have traumatic cardiac events during the
test.
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nation as to what types of illnesses will be eligible for medical monitoring
absent present injury. 141 Third, some analysts assert that courts are not
suited to determine if the benefits of medical monitoring absent injury for
individual plaintiffs outweighs the cost to the American health system. 142
Finally, some critics argue that courts are not the proper venue to determine
the prudence of continuing an individual's program of periodic medical
examinations as that individual's medical circumstances change over
time. 143
D. The Medical Monitoring Remedy Could Be a Breeding Ground for
Plaintiff Windfalls and Misuse of Funds
Even many proponents of the medical monitoring remedy acknowl-
edge that potential plaintiff windfalls and the misuse of medical monitoring
awards are serious issues, especially if awards are distributed directly to
plaintiffs in the form of lump sum payments. 144 The Friends for All Chil-
dren court recognized this risk when it mandated that all money to be used
for medical monitoring would be drawn from an interest-bearing fund that
the defendants established. 145 Plaintiffs were only allowed to draw money
from the fund via a voucher system in which the plaintiffs would obtain
approval to receive a specific medical test from a panel of experts. 146 The
court also required that unused funds would be returned, with interest, to
the defendant. 147
Observers have found that medical monitoring awards distributed in
lump sum payments have resulted in staggering levels of misuse. 148 For
example, one Ayers plaintiff stated that he spent his medical monitoring
award on a new home, and other Ayers plaintiffs reported that they never
even visited the doctor after being awarded a lump sum for medical moni-
toring. 149 Similarly, the majority of the Hansen plaintiffs had failed to sub-
mit to anything more than cursory medical examinations more than seven
years after their award of a lump sum to be used for medical monitoring. 50
The potential for plaintiff windfalls is also ever-present when plain-
141. Id. at 382-83.
142. Id. at 355.
143. Id. at 378.
144. See, e.g., McCarter, supra note 24, at 257 n.158.
145. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 823 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
146. Id. at 823.
147. Id. at 823 n.10.
148. Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 370-72.
149. McCarter, supra note 24, at 257 n.158.
150. Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 372.
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tiffs are able to collect payment for medical monitoring through collateral
sources, such as insurance policies. 151 Where plaintiffs are eligible to col-
lect money for medical monitoring through insurance, any additional
money granted by the courts will lead to double-recovery by the plain-
tiff.152 Such double-recovery flies in the face of the goals of tort law and
traditional notions of equity.153
Many commentators suggest that the trust fund model laid out in
Friends for All Children is the most effective way to prevent plaintiff wind-
falls and the misuse of funds. 154 Such funds stress the importance of ac-
countability and oversight in the distribution of medical monitoring
awards. 155 With the addition of a voucher system requiring expert approval
for disbursement of funds, as advocated in Friends for All Children, courts
could also reduce the frequency of wasteful and unnecessary diagnostic
examinations as the panel would have the ability to veto the use of specific
examinations in specific instances.
III. A PROPOSED MODEL TO DETERMINE WHETHER MEDICAL
MONITORING AWARDS ARE APPROPRIATE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS
Critics of medical monitoring correctly point to a number of real and
potential shortcomings that accompany the recognition of medical monitor-
ing as a valid award. 156 The potential placement of undue burden on judi-
cial and medical resources highlights the importance of devising a system
to prevent unjust medical monitoring awards. 157 Further, unspecific and
unquantifiable legal tests are likely to lead to inconsistent and unpredict-
able awards of medical monitoring.]58
However, smart public policy dictates that medical monitoring should
not be entirely condemned. The mere existence of medical monitoring
awards could act as a deterrent against tortious conduct that could lead to
potential injury and could provide a remedy to those who have been legiti-
mately harmed by such conduct.
Recognizing the benefits and risks of medical monitoring, it becomes
clear that uniform standards should be established to determine whether
151. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442-43 (1997).
152. Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 384.
153. Id.
154. Jordan, supra note 46, at 493.
155. Id.
156. See supra part 11.
157. See supra part 1I, §§ A-B.
158. See supra part 11, § C.
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medical monitoring awards are appropriate in specific instances. These
standards must be strict enough to help courts easily identify and dismiss
frivolous claims and must be specific and objective enough to be judicially
manageable. Therefore, I propose a five-element test for courts to use when
determining whether a medical monitoring award is appropriate.
As will be discussed below, a defendant should be liable to provide
medical monitoring expenses when: (1) the potential injury results from a
specific and traumatic occurrence; (2) scientific evidence suggests that the
defendant's tortious conduct (where "conduct" could entail manufacturing
of goods or exposing the plaintiff to a harmful substance) results in a statis-
tically significant increase in likelihood that the plaintiff will develop a
specific illness; (3) early detection of the specific illness is possible and can
lead to the prevention of death or debilitation; (4) causation can be shown
such that the plaintiff would not reasonably require a specific medical ex-
amination but for the defendant's tortious conduct; and (5) the benefits of
medical monitoring outweigh the costs. The determination of whether each
element is fulfilled should be established by expert testimony conforming
to the standards established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. 159
A. The Potential Injury Results From a Specific and Traumatic
Occurrence
The Friends for All Children Court justified its medical monitoring
award, in part, by establishing that the potential injuries to the plaintiffs
were not merely speculative because they stemmed from a specific and
traumatic occurrence-an airplane crash. 160 Wariness of situations involv-
ing speculative injury is also one of the reasons that the Supreme Court did
not sanction a medical monitoring award in Metro-North. 161 The reasoning
used by these courts was sound, and medical monitoring awards absent
physical injury must not be merely speculative. Rather, they must stem
from specific, traumatic occurrences.
The "specific, traumatic occurrence" element has the added benefit of
making the "direct versus indirect" distinction discussed in Theer1 62 moot.
If a potential injury results from a specific event, then, by definition, it is a
result of direct contact. Therefore, the "direct contact" requirement is en-
capsulated and made more stringent by the "specific, traumatic occurrence"
requirement.
159. 509 U.S. 579, 592-94(1993).
160. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
161. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,440 (1997).
162. Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724, 733 (N.J. 1993).
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It should be noted that it is possible for a plaintiff to fulfill this ele-
ment in toxic tort cases as long as the exposure to a harmful substance re-
sults from a concrete and identifiable occurrence. For example, the element
may be fulfilled as a result of a chemical spill that exposes a plaintiff to
close contact with large amounts of a harmful substance. The element may
not, however, be fulfilled by prolonged contact with low levels of a harm-
ful substance.
B. Scientific Evidence Links the Defendant's Conduct to a Statistically
Significant Increase in Likelihood that the Plaintiff Will Develop a Specific
Illness
The Ayers standard considers factors such as "the significance and ex-
tent of exposure to chemicals," the "toxicity of the chemicals," and "the
relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in those exposed."'163
Though these factors use markedly vague language, they speak generally to
the increased likelihood that a plaintiff will develop a particular illness.
This is a logical place for a court to begin its evaluation of the merits of a
plaintiffs complaint, but these factors do little good without setting spe-
cific limits regarding what levels of exposure, toxicity, and increased like-
lihood of a specific disease may trigger a medical monitoring award.
To fulfill this proposed element, a plaintiff, through use of expert tes-
timony, must point to scientific evidence that suggests that the defendant's
tortious conduct resulted in a statistically significant increase in likelihood
that the plaintiff will develop a specific illness. Here, "conduct" could en-
tail either manufacture of a potentially dangerous good or causing the
plaintiff to be exposed to a harmful substance. To prove this increase in
likelihood of illness, the expert witness must fulfill each of the Daubert
elements. 164 The expert witness should direct the court to peer-reviewed
scientific studies showing a relation between the defendant's conduct and
the likelihood of a specific illness and should testify to her findings, rate of
error, and general acceptance in the scientific community. 165 For example,
if members of a community are exposed to pollutants in their groundwater
that they believe are causing instances of brain cancer, 166 an expert witness
163. Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987). See also Petito v. A.H. Robins Co.,
750 So. 2d 103, 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing "exposure greater than normal background
levels" of "a proven hazardous substance.").
164. 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993). There are four Daubert elements: (1) general acceptance in the
scientific community, (2) findings subjected to peer review and/or publication, (3) findings that have
been tested using the scientific method, and (4) an acceptable rate of error.
165. Id.
166. As in, for example, Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., No. 06-1743, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54210,
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must point to scientific studies verifying a link between the specific pollut-
ant and brain cancer. By pointing to scientific evidence, courts would
counter the speculative nature of many frivolous claims.
C. Early Detection of the Specific Illness is Possible and Can Lead to the
Prevention of Death or Debilitation
The Restatement (Third) of Torts suggests that medical monitoring is
"warranted by the prospect that early diagnosis of a latent condition will
improve the chance of beneficial medical intervention."'167 While this con-
dition makes theoretical sense, it requires an objective legal test to encour-
age consistent and predictable enforcement. Specifically, the term
"beneficial medical intervention" is unnecessarily broad and is left unde-
fined.
To fulfill this proposed element, a plaintiff must be able to show that:
(a) medical tests currently exist to detect the presence of the potential ill-
ness prior to the appearance of symptoms, and (b) early detection can lead
to the prevention of death or debilitation. Here, "debilitation" should be
defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities." 168 For example, if a plaintiff seeks medical
monitoring because she fears that her exposure to large quantities of asbes-
tos will cause her to develop lung cancer, she must show that medical tests
exist that can detect lung cancer before symptoms manifest and that early
detection of lung cancer will improve her chances of survival or at least
prevent substantial physical impairment. Again, this element must be
proven through the testimony of an expert witness who fulfills the Daubert
elements. 169
D. Causation Can be Shown Such That the Plaintiff Would Not
Reasonably Require a Specific Medical Examination But For the
Defendant's Tortious Conduct
When awarding medical monitoring for the first time in the history of
tort law, the Friends for All Children Court recognized that the issue of
causation was controversial.170 After all, it is difficult to prove that a de-
fendant caused an injury if there is no present physical injury. The Friends
at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2007).
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: Supra note 16, § 21 cmt. c.
168. This language is borrowed from the definition of "disability" in the Americans With Disabili-
ties Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(l)(A) (West 2009).
169. See supra note 164.
170. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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for All Children Court answered this critique by holding that the actual
injury in a claim seeking medical monitoring is the expense and necessity
of having to undergo comprehensive diagnostic tests. 171 This reasoning is
sound, and it should be applied to current claims seeking medical monitor-
ing.
To fulfill this proposed element, a plaintiff must show causation by
proving that a specific medical examination would not have been reasona-
bly necessary but for the defendant's tortious conduct. This element must
be proven through the testimony of expert witnesses fulfilling the Daubert
elements. 172 For example, a plaintiff seeking medical monitoring because
he fears that his exposure to large quantities of asbestos will cause him to
develop lung cancer should be disqualified from receiving a medical moni-
toring award if he is a habitual cigarette smoker. The reasoning behind this
disqualification is that a reasonable smoker is aware that smoking increases
one's chances of developing cancer. Therefore, even if the plaintiff had
never been exposed to asbestos, it is reasonable to believe that he would
undergo periodic examinations for lung cancer.
E. The Benefits of Medical Monitoring Outweigh the Costs
In what he calls the "common-sense concept of appropriate medical
monitoring," Schwartz, Lorber, and Laird argue that when medical moni-
toring is appropriate, its potential benefits outweigh its costs. 173 While this
concept certainly makes theoretical sense, it too requires an objective legal
test to promote consistent and predictable results when applied by the
courts.
To fulfill this element, a court must consider such factors as the bene-
fit that specific diagnostic examinations would confer on the plaintiff as far
as promoting an accurate diagnosis, the likelihood that the examination will
reveal the plaintiff's illness, and the likelihood that the plaintiff actually has
the illness. These factors should be weighed against alternative ways that
the medical resource in question could be used. In balancing these factors,
the element is not satisfied unless the court determines that the potential
benefit for the plaintiff outweighs the cost to the general public. For exam-
ple, consider an expert who testifies that a plaintiffs exposure to a particu-
lar pollutant increased her chances of developing a particular disease by ten
percent but puts the overall likelihood that she actually has the disease at
171. Id.
172. See supra note 164.
173. Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 352.
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only two percent. The expert also testifies that there are very few physi-
cians capable of diagnosing the disorder, and those physicians are currently
treating trauma victims returning from a war zone. In this case, medical
monitoring should not be awarded. The societal cost of preventing the phy-
sicians from treating trauma victims returning from a war zone is not out-
weighed by the plaintiffs benefit of being tested for a disease that she is
not likely to have.
IV. A PROPOSED METHOD FOR DISBURSING MEDICAL MONITORING
AWARDS WHEN THEY ARE DEEMED APPROPRIATE
Medical monitoring detractors frequently call attention to problems
associated with the disbursement of medical monitoring awards. 174 To be
sure, the potential for waste1 75 and plaintiff windfalls 76 is omnipresent
when medical monitoring is awarded. Further, plaintiff misuse of medical
monitoring funds is common when the funds are awarded in a lump sum. 177
However, by following the lead of the Friends for All Children Court1 78
and implementing an effective disbursement procedure, these problems can
be avoided.
As will be discussed below, when a medical monitoring award is
granted by the courts, a panel of experts should always determine what
diagnostic examinations are necessary for each plaintiff, even if those
plaintiffs are members of the same class. Second, medical monitoring
awards should never be distributed in a lump sum but should always be
paid out of a fund established by the defendant. Third, if a plaintiff fails to
utilize his medical monitoring award within a reasonable period of time,
the funds designated for medical monitoring should be returned to the de-
fendant.
A. An Expert Panel Should Determine What Medical Examinations are
Necessary for Each Plaintiff
In granting the first medical monitoring award in the history of tort
law, the Friends for All Children Court set a number of limitations. 179 One
of these limitations involved establishing a panel of experts to determine
174. See, e.g., McCarter, supra note 24, at 257 n. 158.
175. See Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 357.
176. See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 443 (1997).
177. See McCarter, supra note 24, at 257 n.158.
178. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
179. Id.
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whether to give a specific diagnostic examination to a specific plaintiff.180
In establishing such a panel, the court recognized that appropriate diagnos-
tic examinations vary from individual to individual, even when those indi-
viduals were exposed to the same environment. 181 By instructing the panel
to customize individual diagnostic schemes for each plaintiff, the court
avoided the waste of resources that would have resulted if the court had
held that each plaintiff would receive every diagnostic examination.
Following the model of Friends for All Children, courts awarding
medical monitoring to a class of plaintiffs should convene a special panel
to establish individualized diagnostic plans for each member of the class.
Panels should consist of physicians and other experts who specialize in the
type of ailment that the plaintiffs could potentially develop. The panel
should consider the individual characteristics of each plaintiff in order to
create a diagnostic scheme that is appropriate for that individual and that
does not involve unnecessary and wasteful examinations. The result will be
the preservation of resources as well as an easier and safer diagnostic regi-
men for the plaintiff.
Convening a panel of experts is likely to raise questions about cost,
but the cost is justified for a number of reasons. First, once the five-factor
test laid out in part III is instituted, medical monitoring is likely to be un-
common and awarded only in instances of severe misconduct. Therefore,
defendants should be forced to endure the expense of convening the panel.
Forcing defendants to bear this extra cost will provide further deterrence
against misconduct, thereby reinforcing a goal of tort law. Second, the cost
of establishing a panel of experts will partially pay for itself by preventing
individual plaintiffs from obtaining costly examinations that the panel con-
siders unnecessary. The panel will also protect defendants by ensuring that
funds designated for medical monitoring are not misused.
B. Medical Monitoring Payments Should Be Distributed Out of a Fund
Created by the Defendant
Potential plaintiff windfalls and the misuse of medical monitoring
funds are serious issues when medical monitoring is awarded. 182 The
Friends for All Children Court dealt with this issue by ordering the defen-
dant to create a fund out of which medical monitoring payments would be
disbursed. 183 When a plaintiff sought a specific diagnostic examination, she
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See McCarter, supra note 24, at 257 n.158.
183. 746 F.2d at 823.
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would confer with the panel of experts. The panel would provide her with a
voucher if it deemed the medical examination necessary. 8 4 The plaintiff
then showed the defendant the voucher and collected payment for that
medical examination. 185 In establishing a fund to be held in trust, the court
ensured that money earmarked for medical monitoring would not be used
for anything other than medical monitoring.
Following the Friends for All Children model, medical monitoring
awards should never be paid to plaintiffs in a lump sum. Awarding lump
sums provides no oversight or control over how the plaintiffs use funds
intended to be used for medical monitoring. 186 Rather, the court should
order the defendant to create a fund to be held in trust solely for the pur-
pose of medical monitoring. Incorporating the panel of experts described
above, a voucher system should be established, whereby plaintiffs may
withdraw money from the fund only if the panel deems a particular diag-
nostic examination necessary. All money left in the fund at the termination
of the medical monitoring period should be returned to the defendant.
C. Incorporating a "Use It or Lose It" Provision
Critics point out that recipients of medical monitoring awards fre-
quently fail to use their awards in a timely manner. 187 Allowing money to
sit unused in a fund benefits neither the plaintiff nor the defendant and is
therefore an issue that must be addressed in a medical monitoring dis-
bursement scheme. An appropriate solution is the institution of a "use it or
lose it" provision in medical monitoring awards. In such a provision, the
panel of experts described above will specify a reasonable period of time
during which medical monitoring recipients should receive their diagnostic
examinations. If a recipient fails to utilize this opportunity, the money ear-
marked for his examination will be returned to the defendant. The purpose
of this provision is twofold. First, medical monitoring recipients will be
encouraged to pursue the award to which they are entitled in a timely man-
ner. Second, the provision will prevent money from sitting idly in an ac-
count for an extended period of time. Instead, the money will be injected
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CONCLUSION
Recent lawsuits against Mattel, Inc. have brought the issue of medical
monitoring into the public spotlight188 As the ALl continues its work on
the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the issue of medical monitoring is likely
to remain a contentious one within the legal community. In tracing the
evolution of medical monitoring from 1970s dicta to the present, support
for it has ebbed and flowed. Detractors have noted their fears that medical
monitoring awards could wreak havoc on judicial and medical resources.'1 89
Others have argued that standards used to award medical monitoring are
judicially unmanageable. 190 Still others fear that medical monitoring leads
to plaintiff windfalls and misuse of funds. 191
However, by establishing specific and judicially manageable standards
by which courts should award medical monitoring, the benefits of medical
monitoring could be garnered while the risks could be mitigated. The five-
element test discussed in this paper provides an objective method for courts
to analyze the appropriateness of medical monitoring on a case by case
basis. Further, the disbursement model discussed in this paper provides a
method for preventing plaintiff windfalls while preserving plaintiff rights.
188. See Efrati, supra note 5, at A7.
189. See Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 369.
190. See Jordan, supra note 46, at 489.
191. See Schwartz et al., supra note 13, at 371.
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